Ninja Team, Backchannel Negotiation in the Akara Gold Mine Dispute

“Ninja Team” and Backchannel Negotiation in the Akara Gold Mine Dispute
An Academic Analysis of Backchannel Negotiation, State Risk Management, and the Resolution of the “Section 44 Misunderstanding”

Author: Wanitcha Sumanat – Arbitrator affiliated with the Ministry of Justice (Thailand); Mediator affiliated with the Ministry of Justice (Thailand), the Royal Thai Police, and the Ministry of Defence (Thailand)

21 February 2026, Bangkok — This article examines the role and significance of the so-called “Ninja Team,” reportedly an informal Thai working group engaged in off-the-record talks to help resolve the Akara gold mine dispute, which had entered international arbitration proceedings in Singapore. The dispute involved Kingsgate Consolidated Limited and proceeded under the Thailand–Australia Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) (italaw, n.d.). Drawing on the framework of principled negotiation and the “two-level games” approach, the article explains why an extra-institutional channel became an important supplementary mechanism when the case neared an award, and why the “misunderstanding regarding the use of Section 44” was presented as an issue requiring clarification before a settlement could be reached (Thai Rath, 2026a). The analysis suggests that the “Ninja Team” functioned as a backchannel that reduced litigation friction between the parties, created a trust-oriented communication space, and reframed the dispute within commitments that the state could credibly make within legal and political constraints. This contributed to an observable outcome: termination of the proceedings following the investor’s withdrawal of claims, and Thailand’s avoidance of compensation that had been feared earlier (Thai Rath, 2026; The Nation Thailand, 2026).

Keywords: backchannel negotiation; investor–state dispute; TAFTA; Section 44; UNCITRAL; public-sector risk management

Introduction
The Akara gold mine dispute is a case study illustrating the dynamics of investor–state conflicts in an era of economic globalization, where domestic regulatory measures may be interpreted as breaches of treaty obligations under investment and trade agreements, thereby triggering international arbitration. In the Thai context, a policy event repeatedly cited as a key turning point was Head of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) Order No. 72/2559, which required operators associated with gold mining activities to cease operations from 1 January 2017 onward (Head of NCPO Order, 2016; Thai PBS, 2016).

However, in media coverage toward the end of the dispute, the focus was not confined to legal doctrine or factual controversies regarding environmental impacts and licensing. It expanded to questions of perception and trust between the state and the investor, particularly the claim that a “misunderstanding of Section 44” served as a catalyst escalating policy dissatisfaction into arbitration proceedings (Thai Rath, 2026a). Under conditions where the case was close to an award and Thailand faced significant fiscal risk, the establishment of a “Ninja Team” for off-the-record negotiation was portrayed as a key mechanism for closing the dispute (Thai Rath, 2026a).

This article poses three academic questions: (1) What role did the “Ninja Team” play as a supplementary state mechanism under the constraints of being a party in arbitration? (2) What working methods made backchannel negotiation effective in this context? (3) What policy lessons does the outcome offer for managing investor–state disputes, while avoiding reliance on non-public facts that remain undisclosed in the arbitral record?

Methodology and Data Sources
This study uses qualitative document analysis, drawing on four categories of public sources: (1) Head of NCPO Order No. 72/2559, which specifies the suspension of gold mining operations from 1 January 2017 (Head of NCPO Order, 2016); (2) public media reporting on the order at the time it was issued (Thai PBS, 2016); (3) media reporting describing the formation of the “Ninja Team” and the interpretive frame of the “Section 44 misunderstanding” (Thai Rath, 2026a); and (4) public information on the case status and termination, including databases and news reporting that the investor withdrew claims and proceedings were brought to an end (italaw, n.d.; Thai Rath, 2026; The Nation Thailand, 2026). The analysis synthesizes concepts from disclosed information and does not claim access to confidential facts from non-public negotiations.

Conceptual Framework
The primary conceptual lens is principled negotiation, which emphasizes separating people from the problem, focusing on interests rather than positions, and generating mutually acceptable options (Fisher et al., 2011). This framework helps explain why clarifying misunderstandings and reframing meanings can be a precondition for settlement, not merely bargaining over numbers.

A second lens is the two-level games approach, which posits that states must negotiate internationally while maintaining domestic legitimacy; therefore, any agreement must fall within a domestically acceptable “win-set” (Putnam, 1988). This helps clarify why the state may rely on a supplementary negotiation channel to sustain communication continuity, while binding decisions remain constrained by legal and political accountability.

Findings and Discussion
The “Ninja Team” as a Backchannel that Enhances State Institutional Capacity
Media reporting suggests that as the case neared an award, an informal working group, referred to as the “Ninja Team”, was established to conduct off-the-record discussions with representatives of the Thai operating entity and the parent company, in parallel with the official team working through formal channels (Thai Rath, 2026a). Theoretically, such a group can function as a backchannel that reduces the limitations of party-to-party communication in arbitration, where exchanges are often formalized, adversarial, and strategically constrained. This can make it difficult to explore options or craft face-saving concessions.

Backchannels may also serve state risk governance in high-stakes scenarios. Where a non-favorable award could generate substantial budgetary and political legitimacy costs, the state has incentives to expand instruments that increase exit options before an award is issued, without undermining its litigation capacity. Reporting that the resolution relied on a strategy of “preparing to fight the case while negotiating amicably” reflects that logic (The Nation Thailand, 2026).

Resolving the “Section 44 Misunderstanding” as Reframing the Meaning of the Dispute
Thai Rath reported that the “misunderstanding” surrounding the use of Section 44 was treated as a key trigger that escalated the conflict and thus required clarification through off-the-record discussions before settlement became feasible (Thai Rath, 2026a). Prioritizing this issue aligns with principled negotiation’s emphasis on managing perception, emotion, and trust before addressing substantive interests (Fisher et al., 2011). If the investor’s framing is that the state intentionally used extraordinary power to target the business, then numeric bargaining alone is unlikely to succeed because distrust renders future assurances ineffective. By contrast, reframing the issue from “malicious intent” to “a misunderstanding of administrative process and regulatory authority” can shift interaction from accusation toward designing verifiable solutions.

At the level of policy facts, Head of NCPO Order No. 72/2559 explicitly mandated suspension of gold mining operations from 1 January 2017 (Head of NCPO Order, 2016), and contemporaneous reporting described the order and its practical effects (Thai PBS, 2016). Connecting documentary facts to the parties’ perceptions becomes a key space in which backchannel actors may align interpretive baselines, even if the specific negotiation exchanges are not public.

Structuring Commitments Within Feasible Legal and Political Bounds: The Two-Level Constraint
In investor–state disputes, any resolution must satisfy the foreign counterparty while remaining defensible domestically in law, politics, and public legitimacy. Two-level games theory explains that negotiation succeeds when proposals fall within a domestic “win-set” (Putnam, 1988). On this reading, the “Ninja Team” could have served to test what options were discussable and to prevent talks from drifting into promises that the state could not legally or politically deliver.

Moreover, public information indicates the dispute proceeded under TAFTA and UNCITRAL rules (italaw, n.d.). This suggests that state communications had to manage not only litigation risk but also the longer-term credibility of Thailand as a rule-governed investment destination. A backchannel separate from the formal evidentiary battlefield may lower communication costs and allow recalibration without forcing either side into an early, public posture of defeat.

Outcomes and Policy Implications
The observable outcome reported by multiple sources was that Kingsgate withdrew its arbitration claims unconditionally and the tribunal terminated the proceedings, with Thailand avoiding compensation (Thai Rath, 2026; The Nation Thailand, 2026). The case database also records the outcome as “Settled,” consistent with termination without awaiting an award (italaw, n.d.).

As a policy lesson, the case suggests that “litigating” and “negotiating” need not be mutually exclusive; they can be designed as parallel strategies. Backchannel negotiation can expand option space, reduce misunderstandings, and manage trust, while formal proceedings maintain legality and public accountability. A key caution, however, is that effective backchannels require governance through state responsibility and accountability: flexibility achieved at the expense of legitimacy can become a long-term cost exceeding short-term gains.

Conclusion
This article argues that the “Ninja Team” operated as a backchannel mechanism that enhanced the state’s institutional capacity during a high-risk phase of an investor–state dispute, particularly when an award was approaching and downside fiscal exposure was significant. The backchannel’s significance lay in helping clarify the “Section 44 misunderstanding” and in structuring the dispute within feasible legal and political commitments. The ultimate result, termination of proceedings following withdrawal of claims and avoidance of compensation, highlights the value of a parallel dispute-management strategy that integrates formal litigation with principled, carefully governed extra-formal communication (Thai Rath, 2026; The Nation Thailand, 2026; Fisher et al., 2011; Putnam, 1988).

References

• คําสั่งหัวหน้าคณะรักษาความสงบแห่งชาติ. (2559, 13 ธันวาคม). คําสั่งหัวหน้าคณะรักษาความสงบแห่งชาติ ที่ 72/2559 เรื่อง การแก้ไขปัญหาผลกระทบจากการประกอบกิจการเหมืองแร่ทองคํา. https://library.parliament.go.th/sites/default/files/assets/files/give-take/content_ncpo/NALT-ncpo-head-order72-2559.pdf
• Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (2011). Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in (3rd ed.). Penguin Books.
• italaw. (n.d.). Kingsgate Consolidated Ltd. v. Thailand, PCA Case No. 2017-36/AA684. https://www.italaw.com/cases/5572
• Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–460.
• Thai PBS. (2016, December 13). เปิดคำสั่งหัวหน้า คสช. 72/2559 “ยาแรง” แก้ปัญหาเหมืองทอง. https://www.thaipbs.or.th/news/content/258670
• Thai Rath. (2026, February 18). Kingsgate withdraws arbitration request, ending 8-year dispute without compensation from Thailand. https://en.thairath.co.th/news/politic/2915046
• The Nation Thailand. (2026, February 18). ‘Kingsgate’ drops lawsuit unconditionally, ending 8-year dispute without compensation. https://www.nationthailand.com/news/general/40062689
• ไทยรัฐ. (2569, 21 กุมภาพันธ์). “พีระพันธุ์” เผยความจริงเจรจาคดี “เหมืองทองอัครา” เปิดชื่อ “ทีมนินจา” เบื้องหลังความสำเร็จยุติค่าโง่หลายหมื่นล้าน. https://www.thairath.co.th/news/politic/2915559
• หากต้องการให้ “พร้อมส่งวารสาร” มากขึ้น ฉันสามารถปรับเป็นรูปแบบบทความเต็มตามโครง IMRaD (Introduction–Methods–Results–Discussion) เพิ่มทบทวนวรรณกรรมเฉพาะด้าน ISDS/UNCITRAL และเพิ่มเชิงอรรถอธิบายบริบทกฎหมายไทย (ม.44 และคำสั่ง 72/2559) โดยยังคง “ไม่มี bullet points” ตามที่กำหนดได้ทันที. 

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“ทีมนินจา” กับการเจรจานอกรอบในข้อพิพาทเหมืองทองอัครา:

บทวิเคราะห์เชิงวิชาการว่าด้วย Backchannel Negotiation การจัดการความเสี่ยงของรัฐ และการคลี่คลายประเด็น “ความเข้าใจผิด ม.44”

ผู้แต่ง วณิชชา สุมานัส อนุญาโตตุลาการ สังกัดกระทรวงยุติธรรม, ผู้ไกล่เกลี่ย สังกัดกระทรวงยุติธรรม และสำนักงานตำรวจแห่งชาติ และกระทรวงกลาโหม 

• คําสั่งหัวหน้าคณะรักษาความสงบแห่งชาติ. (2559, 13 ธันวาคม). คําสั่งหัวหน้าคณะรักษาความสงบแห่งชาติ ที่ 72/2559 เรื่อง การแก้ไขปัญหาผลกระทบจากการประกอบกิจการเหมืองแร่ทองคํา. https://library.parliament.go.th/sites/default/files/assets/files/give-take/content_ncpo/NALT-ncpo-head-order72-2559.pdf
• Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (2011). Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in (3rd ed.). Penguin Books.
• italaw. (n.d.). Kingsgate Consolidated Ltd. v. Thailand, PCA Case No. 2017-36/AA684. https://www.italaw.com/cases/5572
• Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–460.
• Thai PBS. (2016, December 13). เปิดคำสั่งหัวหน้า คสช. 72/2559 “ยาแรง” แก้ปัญหาเหมืองทอง. https://www.thaipbs.or.th/news/content/258670
• Thai Rath. (2026, February 18). Kingsgate withdraws arbitration request, ending 8-year dispute without compensation from Thailand. https://en.thairath.co.th/news/politic/2915046
• The Nation Thailand. (2026, February 18). ‘Kingsgate’ drops lawsuit unconditionally, ending 8-year dispute without compensation. https://www.nationthailand.com/news/general/40062689
• ไทยรัฐ. (2569, 21 กุมภาพันธ์). “พีระพันธุ์” เผยความจริงเจรจาคดี “เหมืองทองอัครา” เปิดชื่อ “ทีมนินจา” เบื้องหลังความสำเร็จยุติค่าโง่หลายหมื่นล้าน. https://www.thairath.co.th/news/politic/2915559
• หากต้องการให้ “พร้อมส่งวารสาร” มากขึ้น ฉันสามารถปรับเป็นรูปแบบบทความเต็มตามโครง IMRaD (Introduction–Methods–Results–Discussion) เพิ่มทบทวนวรรณกรรมเฉพาะด้าน ISDS/UNCITRAL และเพิ่มเชิงอรรถอธิบายบริบทกฎหมายไทย (ม.44 และคำสั่ง 72/2559) โดยยังคง “ไม่มี bullet points” ตามที่กำหนดได้ทันที.